生成角色扮演场景

Title: Role‑Play Simulation for International Law: Maritime Dispute Negotiation

1. Purpose and Learning Outcomes This simulation assesses students’ ability to apply the law of the sea and related dispute-settlement frameworks to a complex, multi-stakeholder maritime dispute. It also evaluates negotiation planning and execution grounded in evidence and legal authority. By the end, students should be able to:

• Interpret and apply relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to overlapping claims, navigation, fisheries, and environmental obligations.[1]
• Propose and justify maritime delimitation approaches using the three-stage method and relevant jurisprudence.[2]
• Design lawful provisional arrangements of a practical nature consistent with Articles 74(3) and 83(3) UNCLOS, without prejudicing final delimitation.
• Select appropriate dispute-settlement and de-escalation mechanisms under Part XV UNCLOS and related jurisprudence, recognizing optional exceptions under Article 298.
• Conduct interest-based negotiations adhering to best practices in mutual-gains bargaining and ethical standards.[3]

2. Scenario Synopsis (Fictional States and Sea Area) Geography and claims. Two neighboring coastal States—Auroria and Bellamar—border the semi-enclosed Caladan Sea. Both are parties to UNCLOS and have lodged optional exceptions under Article 298 excluding compulsory procedures for maritime delimitation. Each has proclaimed a 200 nm EEZ and continental shelf from its mainland coast. Their EEZ/continental shelf claims overlap significantly. Key maritime features include:

• Beacon Reef: a small feature with a helipad and desalination unit. It hosts a rotating coast guard detachment and meteorological station. There are rainwater catchments but no natural freshwater lens. Auroria asserts it is a fully entitled “island” under Article 121(2), generating its own EEZ and continental shelf. Bellamar claims it is a “rock” within Article 121(3) with no entitlement beyond 12 nm.
• North Bank: a shoal that is fully submerged at high tide and exposed at low tide (a low-tide elevation).
• Pelican Islet: a tiny outcrop used seasonally by fishers; no permanent population.
• Strait of Selas: a narrow channel used for international navigation connecting the Caladan Sea to the high seas.

Economic and security context. Auroria granted Constellation Energy an offshore hydrocarbon exploration license (Block Z) that straddles the overlapping claims area. Bellamar protested and authorized patrols by its maritime enforcement agency. A near-collision occurred between patrol vessels. A Bellamar trawler (Sea Dawn) was detained by Auroria’s coast guard for alleged illegal fishing; the crew remains in custody pending bond. Coral habitats and migratory turtle nesting sites lie adjacent to North Bank. Local fisheries are overexploited and straddle the putative boundary.

Prior engagement and positions. Informal talks failed after Auroria published adjusted straight baselines on segments of its deeply indented coast; Bellamar labeled them excessive. Both States agree to attempt a mediated negotiation under the auspices of the Regional Oceanic Security and Economic Association (ROSEA), with observer participation by a regional fisheries body and an international energy industry association.

3. Roles and Confidential Briefs Assign students to the following roles (6–10 participants; teams may include legal and technical advisers):

• Auroria Delegation (Head of Delegation; Legal Adviser; Hydrographer) Interests: maximize resource access; defend validity and effect of Beacon Reef; protect energy investments; maintain maritime security presence. Red lines: no admission that Beacon Reef is a “rock”; no full moratorium on seismic surveys; avoid third-party adjudication now. BATNA: continue surveys and enforce fisheries law; consider Part XV conciliation (voluntary) but avoid binding delimitation proceedings due to Article 298 declaration.
• Bellamar Delegation (Head of Delegation; Legal Adviser; Fisheries Adviser) Interests: minimize effect of small features; secure equitable delimitation closer to equidistance from mainland coasts; protect artisanal fisheries; ensure prompt release of crew. Red lines: no recognition of straight baselines where conditions are not met; no unilateral drilling; insist on bond and release for Sea Dawn crew. BATNA: seek provisional measures if necessary and increase diplomatic pressure; propose joint development but only with activity freeze.
• ROSEA Mediator (Chair; Secretariat Officer) Mandate: facilitate principled negotiation; help parties identify a provisional arrangements package covering hydrocarbons, fisheries, safety, and de-escalation; ensure consistency with UNCLOS. Constraints: cannot impose a decision; can propose a single-text draft and caucus separately.
• Constellation Energy (Observer-Participant upon consent) Interests: legal certainty; safety of operations; willingness to pivot to a joint development zone (JDZ) if protected by stabilization clauses. Red lines: prolonged shutdown without compensation; exposure to use-of-force risks.
• Regional Fisheries Organization (Observer; may provide technical input) Interests: sustainable yields; recognition of straddling stocks and data sharing; bycatch mitigation; closed seasons and gear restrictions.
• Civil Society/Marine Environmental NGO (Observer; invited expert) Interests: habitat protection around North Bank; EIA before new seismic/drilling; incident reporting and joint spill response.
• Coast Guard/Maritime Safety Officials (Advisers embedded in delegations) Interests: safety at sea; rules for encounters; hotlines; incident prevention.

4. Legal Issues to Surface (with Authorities)

• Status of maritime features: The classification of Beacon Reef under Article 121 is pivotal. Rocks that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” do not generate EEZ/continental shelf.[4] The South China Sea Award clarifies that occasional presence of personnel and artificial installations do not confer full entitlement under Article 121(3).[5]
• Low-tide elevations: North Bank cannot independently generate maritime zones and cannot be appropriated as territory; however, it may be used as a base point only under limited conditions.[6]
• Baselines: Normal baselines follow the low-water line (Article 5). Straight baselines are permissible only where the coastline is deeply indented or fringed with islands (Article 7), a standard refined in case law to avoid excessive enclosures.[7]
• Delimitation standards: Articles 74 and 83 require an equitable solution. The prevailing jurisprudence employs a three-stage methodology: provisional equidistance line; adjustment for relevant circumstances (e.g., coastal lengths, concavity, small feature effect); disproportionality test.[8] Islands may receive reduced or no effect where they would cause a disproportionate shift of the line.[9]
• Duty to cooperate and provisional arrangements: Pending final delimitation, parties must make “every effort” to enter provisional arrangements and not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement (Arts 74(3), 83(3)).
• Dispute settlement and optional exceptions: Part XV provides compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions, subject to Article 298 optional exceptions for delimitation. Even where excluded, the duty to exchange views (Art 283) applies. Provisional measures may be available in certain circumstances (Art 290) and prompt release of vessels and crews upon bond is required under Article 292; see ITLOS practice.[10]
• Navigation regimes: Innocent passage (Art 17) and transit passage through straits used for international navigation (Arts 37–44) should be addressed in conduct-at-sea understandings.
• Environmental obligations: States have a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment (Art 192), including due diligence, EIA where there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, and cooperation.[11]
• Fisheries: Conservation and utilization obligations (Arts 61–62), including cooperation for shared and straddling stocks; the UN Fish Stocks Agreement informs best practices for data sharing and management measures.[12]

5. Negotiation Tasks and Deliverables Pre‑negotiation (Individual/Team; graded):

• Legal Position Paper (1,500 words). Propose a maritime boundary using charts and coordinates; justify with UNCLOS and jurisprudence, including treatment of Beacon Reef and baseline methodology. Include alternative proposals and an equitable-solution analysis.
• Negotiation Plan (up to 2 pages). Identify interests, BATNA, reservation value, potential package deals (e.g., JDZ parameters, fisheries measures, safety-at-sea protocols), and risk mitigations. Reference negotiation scholarship on mutual gains and single-text drafting.[13]

In‑session (Observed; graded):

• Plenary and Caucus Negotiations (120 minutes). Mediator may deploy a single-text process. Parties should table proposals on:
  • Provisional arrangements: JDZ or moratorium with data-sharing; fisheries management; joint EIA and incident response; notification and rules for encounters at sea.
  • De-escalation: hotlines, prompt release bond terms, and non-use-of-force commitments.
  • Process: technical working group, timelines, and terms of reference for delimitation talks.

Post‑session (Team; graded):

• Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (up to 1,500 words). Must:
  • Establish provisional arrangements compliant with Arts 74(3)/83(3) “without prejudice.”
  • Set fisheries conservation measures consistent with Arts 61–62 and any regional instrument.
  • Provide a safety-at-sea protocol (hotline, incident reporting, exclusion zones).
  • Outline dispute management (consultations, expert facilitation, possible recourse to conciliation or provisional measures).
• Reflective Brief (500–800 words). Explain how the final package aligns with UNCLOS obligations, relevant cases, and negotiation best practices; identify remaining legal risks and monitoring needs.

6. Assessment Criteria and Evidence Evidence sources:

• Written: Legal Position Paper; Negotiation Plan; Draft MoU; Reflective Brief.
• Observed: Negotiation performance (checklist); mediator’s structured observation notes; peer feedback.

Analytic rubric (weights):

• Legal accuracy and authoritative use of sources (30%): Correct application of UNCLOS provisions and case law; accurate feature classification; defensible delimitation reasoning with three-stage methodology.
• Design of lawful provisional arrangements (15%): Measures are workable, “without prejudice,” and do not jeopardize/hamper agreement.
• Negotiation strategy and ethics (20%): Clear interests/BATNA; principled bargaining; effective use of single-text/caucus; transparent, non-misleading advocacy.
• Drafting quality and precision (20%): Clarity, internal consistency, justiciability of clauses; explicit compliance references (e.g., Arts 74(3), 83(3), 192, 292).
• Reflection and learning (15%): Insight into trade-offs; recognition of uncertainties; alignment with evidence and doctrine.

Reliability and validity measures:

• Construct validity is supported by performance across multiple indicators (doctrine application, strategy, drafting, reflection) aligned to learning outcomes.[14]
• Inter-rater reliability via double marking of written outputs and norming sessions using annotated exemplars.
• Fairness through standardized briefs, identical time-on-task, and published criteria; mediator uses a structured observation protocol focused on evidence of legal reasoning and principled negotiation behaviors.

7. Suggested Timeline and Logistics

• Week 1: Release dossier and confidential briefs; Q&A on legal framework.
• Week 2: Submit Position Paper and Negotiation Plan; formative feedback.
• Week 3: 2-hour negotiation; real-time observation and evidence capture.
• Week 4: Submit Draft MoU and Reflective Brief; debrief seminar.

8. Debrief Prompts

• How did your proposed line compare under different treatments of Beacon Reef? Which relevant circumstances were decisive and why?
• Which elements of the South China Sea Award regarding Article 121(3) informed your classification analysis, and how did you address uncertainty?
• Did your provisional arrangements meet the “without prejudice” standard and avoid jeopardizing/hampering final agreement? Identify specific clauses that accomplish this.
• What dispute management options remain feasible given the parties’ Article 298 declarations? Under what conditions would provisional measures or prompt release be appropriate?
• Which fisheries and environmental obligations most strongly constrained your options, and how were they operationalized in the MoU?

References (OSCOLA endnotes)

1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).
2. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) (Judgment) [2009] ICJ Rep 61, paras 115–122; see also Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v India) (Award) PCA Case No 2010-16 (7 July 2014) paras 217–226; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) (Judgment) ITLOS Case No 16 (14 March 2012) paras 235–240.
3. Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (3rd edn, Penguin 2011) 10–14; Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnen and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer (eds), The Consensus Building Handbook (Sage 1999) chs 9–11.
4. UNCLOS, art 121; see generally, Clive R Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (Brill 1979; updated scholarship confirms core doctrine).
5. South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Award) PCA Case No 2013-19 (12 July 2016) paras 475–476, 626–647 (Article 121(3) interpretation and feature-by-feature analysis).
6. South China Sea Arbitration (Award) (n 5) paras 373–381 (low-tide elevations); see also UNCLOS, arts 13 and 60(8).
7. UNCLOS, arts 5 and 7; see also Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116; more recent scrutiny in South China Sea Arbitration (Award) (n 5) paras 573–626 (straight baselines).
8. Black Sea (n 2) paras 115–122; Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 2) paras 235–240; Bangladesh/India (n 2) paras 217–226.
9. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, paras 281–319 (concavity and island effect); Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 2) paras 317–322 (limited effect to St Martin’s Island beyond 12 nm).
10. UNCLOS, arts 283, 290, 292, 297–298; The M/V “SAIGA” (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (Judgment) ITLOS Case No 2 (1 July 1999) paras 106–113; The “Volga” (Russian Federation v Australia) (Judgment) ITLOS Case No 11 (23 December 2002) paras 77–83; The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) ITLOS Case No 10 (3 December 2001) paras 82–89 (cooperation and provisional measures).
11. UNCLOS, art 192; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14, paras 197–204 (EIA as a customary obligation); South China Sea Arbitration (Award) (n 5) paras 927–993 (due diligence and environmental harm).
12. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UNCLOS relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (adopted 4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001) 2167 UNTS 88; UNCLOS, arts 61–67.
13. Fisher, Ury and Patton (n 3) 97–106 (single-text procedure); Susskind et al (n 3) ch 30 (mutual gains and joint fact-finding).
14. Samuel Messick, ‘Validity of Psychological Assessment: Validation of Inferences from Persons’ Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning’ (1995) 50 American Psychologist 741 (generalizable validity framework supporting performance assessment design).

以下方案面向中学高年级至本科初年级学生，旨在为“气候协商”主题构建一个标准化、可评分、可复用的角色扮演评估情境。设计聚焦三项关键可控因素：身份（role identity）、证据（evidence）、难度（difficulty），以支持可靠与有效的证据收集与解释。设计思路遵循基于证据的有效性论证与绩效评估原则（Kane, 2013; Messick, 1994; Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001），并借鉴客观结构化情境评估（OSCE）的标准化做法以提升评分一致性（Harden et al., 1975），同时兼顾公平性与可及性（AERA, APA, & NCME, 2014; CAST, 2018）。

This scenario targets upper-secondary to early undergraduate students and offers a standardized, scorable, reusable role-play assessment in the context of “climate negotiations.” It controls identity, evidence, and difficulty to enable reliable, valid inferences about student performance. The design aligns with argument-based validity and performance assessment principles (Kane, 2013; Messick, 1994; Pellegrino et al., 2001) and adopts OSCE-like standardization to strengthen reliability (Harden et al., 1975), with fairness and accessibility provisions (AERA, APA, & NCME, 2014; CAST, 2018).

一、测评目标与构念

• 主要构念：
  1. 证据驱动的论证（基于数据与权威报告制定主张与支撑）；2) 协商与策略推理（在约束下设计可行让步与交易）；3) 定量与政策素养（解读气候指标、条约条款与政策选项）；4) 合作与伦理推理（公平、气候正义与代际责任的权衡）。
• 证据来源与表征： 口头陈述、谈判过程行为（观察量表）、谈判文本（联合公报/条文草案）、个人事后政策备忘录。
• 预期用途： 形成性改进与总结性评分兼容；可与多回合任务与多评阅者结合提高普遍化信度（Shavelson & Webb, 1991）。

I. Assessment goals and constructs

• Focal constructs:
  1. Evidence-based argumentation; 2) Negotiation and strategic reasoning under constraints; 3) Quantitative and policy literacy; 4) Collaboration and ethical reasoning.
• Evidentiary sources: Oral statements, observed behaviors, negotiated text (joint communiqué/decision draft), and a post-task policy memo.
• Intended use: Formative improvement and summative scoring; supports multi-task, multi-rater designs to enhance generalizability (Shavelson & Webb, 1991).

二、标准化情境（气候协商）简介

• 背景：模拟一次缔约方大会（COP）部长级非正式磋商，焦点为通过一份“全球盘点（Global Stocktake）行动包”草案，包括：2030/2035减排力度表述、资金与损失损害安排、透明度与盘点机制的文字。
• 成功条件（公开、统一）：若草案满足预设“合意阈值”（例如：覆盖四个议题、文本互不矛盾、在证据包范围内引用且逻辑自洽），即达成“通过”；否则“未通过”。

II. Standardized scenario (climate negotiation) overview

• Context: An informal ministerial at a COP aims to adopt a “Global Stocktake Action Package” draft, covering mitigation ambition wording (2030/2035), finance and loss-and-damage arrangements, and transparency/stocktake language.
• Success criteria (uniform and public): Adoption occurs if the draft meets predefined adequacy thresholds (coverage of four items, non-contradiction, evidence-cited within the packet, and coherent logic). Otherwise, it fails.

三、受控身份设计（Role Identity Control）

• 原则：使用“角色原型”而非真实国家名称，以减少外部先验与价值冲突；每个角色提供等长、等结构身份简表，含：授权目标、国内约束、不可逾越底线（red lines）、可考虑的让步区间、偏好排序、谈判指标。
• 统一角色集（6选5，均衡搭配）：
  1. 高排放发达经济体 HDE（High-emitting developed economy）
  2. 新兴工业化经济体 EIE（Emerging industrializing economy）
  3. 小岛屿气候脆弱体 SIS（Climate-vulnerable small island state）
  4. 最不发达国家 LDC（Least developed country）
  5. 化石燃料出口经济体 FFE（Fossil-fuel exporting economy）
  6. 多边气候基金官员 MCF（Multilateral climate finance official，具有协调与技术说明职能，不参与投票）
• 标准化身份简表结构（每人1页）：
  • 任务授权（3个优先目标，含最低可接受成果陈述）
  • 约束条件（政治/经济/技术三类，每类不超过2条）
  • 底线与红线（最多3条，需可观察）
  • 可让步与交换筹码（最多3项，含触发条件）
  • 证据引用优先级（优先使用哪类证据及其阐释角度）
  • 量化指标（如：希望的资金区间、文本关键词偏好）
• 统一话语权规则：每轮发言限时相同；主持人（考官）按脚本控制轮次与时长，确保机会公平（Harden et al., 1975）。

III. Controlled role identities

• Principle: Use role archetypes instead of real country names to minimize prior bias; provide equal-length, equal-structure briefs specifying mandates, constraints, red lines, concessions, preference orderings, and indicators.
• Standardized role set (choose 5 of 6 for balance): HDE, EIE, SIS, LDC, FFE, plus MCF (facilitator/technical, non-voting).
• Role brief (1 page per role): Mandate (3 priority goals with minimally acceptable outcomes), constraints (political/economic/technical), red lines (≤3), concessions and triggers (≤3), evidence priorities, and quantitative indicators.
• Equal speaking-time rules with scripted facilitation to standardize opportunities (Harden et al., 1975).

四、证据包设计（Evidence Control）

• 核心证据包（所有角色共享，统一分页编号）： A. 科学依据：IPCC AR6 综合报告的执行摘要选段与关键图示（IPCC, 2023） B. 法律框架：巴黎协定相关条款摘录（目标、NDC、资金与透明度；UNFCCC, 2015） C. 政策差距：排放差距与进展概览（以权威年度报告节选为主，如UNEP Emissions Gap报告的要点摘录；避免提供未校核数值） D. 定义与术语表：关键概念一致释义（例如“公正转型”“损失与损害”）
• 角色定制补充页（每人1页，且内容长度与密度匹配）：
  • 角色相关的数据解读角度与引用提示（不新增外部数据，仅改变叙述焦点）
  • 文本偏好关键词样例（如“逐步减少/逐步淘汰”措辞偏好）
• 证据使用规则：
  • 所有可引用信息必须来自证据包并注明页码；评分将依据准确引用与恰当解释（避免外部搜索带来的不均等；AERA et al., 2014）。
  • 不提供可运算模拟器；改用预制“情景摘要卡”（如不同措辞对可追责性与可核查性影响的对照），降低工具差异带来的误差。

IV. Evidence packet

• Core packet (shared, paginated): A. Science: Excerpts and key figures from IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report (IPCC, 2023) B. Law: Excerpts of Paris Agreement articles on goals, NDCs, finance, transparency (UNFCCC, 2015) C. Policy gaps: Curated excerpts from authoritative annual reports (e.g., UNEP Emissions Gap key messages; avoid unverified numbers) D. Glossary: Standardized definitions (e.g., just transition, loss and damage)
• Role-specific addendum (1 page per role; content density matched): Perspective cues, citation prompts, and sample wording preferences; no new external data.
• Evidence use rules: All claims must cite the packet with page numbers; scoring rewards accurate citation and interpretation; no external search to ensure equity (AERA et al., 2014). Provide pre-made “scenario summary cards” instead of live simulators to reduce tool inequities.

五、难度控制（Difficulty Control）

• 难度维度与开关：
  1. 议题广度：必谈议题数量（2/3/4个子议题）
  2. 信息清晰度：证据措辞的明确/含混程度（提供更/少的解释性脚注）
  3. 时间压力：总时长与回合数（如60/75/90分钟）
  4. 立场对立度：红线相互冲突的强度（提高“不可兼容”项的数量）
  5. 事件干预：中段插入一则“新闻快讯”卡（如极端天气或宏观经济波动），改变某角色可让步区间
• 难度等级样例：
  • 基础（A）：2个议题、清晰证据标注、90分钟、无事件
  • 中级（B）：3个议题、部分含混证据、75分钟、1次事件
  • 高级（C）：4个议题、存在证据张力、60分钟、1–2次事件且红线冲突明显
• 教学-评估一致性：难度调整不改变被测构念，主要通过任务条件操控认知负荷与协商复杂度（Sitzmann, 2011）。

V. Difficulty control

• Dimensions: Topic breadth, evidence clarity, time pressure, stance polarity (red-line conflicts), and mid-session events.
• Levels: Basic (2 topics, clear evidence, 90 minutes, no event); Intermediate (3 topics, some ambiguity, 75 minutes, 1 event); Advanced (4 topics, evidence tension, 60 minutes, 1–2 events, strong conflicts).
• Construct-preserving manipulation to adjust cognitive load and negotiation complexity (Sitzmann, 2011).

六、施测流程与材料

• 时序（建议总时长60–90分钟）：
  1. 预备（10–15’）：统一说明、发放角色简表与证据包、静默阅读与标注
  2. 开场陈述（每人2’）：提出主张与依据（须标注证据包页码）
  3. 小组磋商（2–3轮×10’）：主持人按脚本提示聚焦点与时限
  4. 起草文本（15’）：共同拟定简版行动包（≤300词，含至少3处证据引用括注）
  5. 终场确认（5’）：各方表决并给出合规性自评
  6. 事后备忘录（课后24小时内，300–500词）：阐明取舍、证据权衡与角色一致性
• 记录与采分材料：
  • 录音/转写（若允许）、观察量表、草案文本、个人备忘录、证据引用清单。

VI. Administration and materials

• Timeline (60–90 minutes): Briefing; opening statements; two to three negotiation rounds; drafting; adoption check; 24-hour post-task memo.
• Collected artifacts: Audio/transcripts (if permitted), observation checklist, draft text, memo, citation list.

七、评分框架与量表（Rubrics）

• 分析性量表（6维度；每维4级，明确锚定样例；Jonsson & Svingby, 2007）：
  1. 证据使用与准确性（来源合规、解释恰当、引用规范）
  2. 论证质量（主张-证据-论据链条完整性；Toulmin 框架对齐）
  3. 协商策略与一致性（与角色目标/约束一致，交易设计可行）
  4. 定量/政策素养（正确解读指标与条款逻辑，不过度外推）
  5. 合作与伦理推理（公平与正义考量，尊重他方约束）
  6. 产出质量（文本清晰、可执行、与证据一致；达成度以“相对角色目标”衡量，避免绝对立场偏置）
• 评分证据的映射：
  • 口头陈述与过程行为→维度1–5
  • 文本与备忘录→维度1–6
• 评分与一致性：
  • 至少20%样本双评，计算ICC（连续评分）与κ系数（分类核对）（Hallgren, 2012）
  • 评阅员培训与锚定样例包（边界样本与典型样本），每轮再校准（AERA et al., 2014）

VII. Scoring and rubrics

• Analytic rubric with six dimensions (4 performance levels; anchored exemplars; Jonsson & Svingby, 2007): Evidence use; Argumentation quality; Negotiation strategy; Quantitative/policy literacy; Collaboration and ethics; Product quality. Outcome attainment is judged relative to role mandates to avoid positional bias.
• Evidence mapping and reliability: Double-scoring ≥20% with ICC and kappa (Hallgren, 2012); rater training with anchor sets and periodic recalibration (AERA et al., 2014).

八、标准化、信度与效度证据

• 标准化做法：
  • 统一脚本（主持人提示词、时间节点、事件卡触发条件）
  • 统一材料（等长身份简表与证据包，统一分页）
  • 统一流程（发言时限与轮次）
• 信度提升：
  • 多任务/多回合与多评阅员设计，开展G研究估计误差来源（Shavelson & Webb, 1991）
  • 评分者盲评文本产出，过程行为由独立观察者记录
• 有效性论证（Kane, 2013; Messick, 1994）：
  • 构念层面：任务需求与目标构念对齐（证据化的论证与协商）
  • 评分推断：量表锚定样例与评分者培训支撑可解释的一致性
  • 外推推断：跨难度/跨回合的稳定性检验
  • 决策后果：课堂反馈与再学习应用的正向后果监测

VIII. Standardization, reliability, and validity

• Standardization: Scripted facilitation, unified materials, and fixed timing.
• Reliability: Multi-task/round and multi-rater design with G-study; blind scoring of products and independent process observations.
• Validity argument: Construct alignment, scoring inference supported by anchors/training, extrapolation via stability across forms, and monitoring consequences of use (Kane, 2013; Messick, 1994).

九、公平性与可及性

• 措施：
  • 采用中性“角色原型”避免地缘政治标签；简化语言并提供术语表
  • 允许合理便利（延长阅读时间、替代性表达方式），材料可及性符合UDL建议（CAST, 2018）
  • 明确禁止外部资料以避免资源差异；仅以证据包为依据评分（AERA et al., 2014）

IX. Fairness and accessibility

• Measures: Neutral archetypes; plain-language supports and glossary; reasonable accommodations; UDL-aligned materials (CAST, 2018); evidence-packet-only rules to equalize access (AERA et al., 2014).

十、实施示例材料（摘录）

• 主持人开场脚本（统一）：说明任务、时间、成功条件与证据规则。
• 事件卡样例（中级难度）：最新极端天气通报—SIS可让步条件放宽资金优先顺序；FFE要求在措辞中保留“技术中立”表述。
• 文本模板：包含“缓解”“资金/损失与损害”“透明度/盘点”三个标题段，每段≤100词，且括注证据包页码不少于1处。

X. Sample administration elements

• Standardized opening script, sample event card (Intermediate), and a structured draft template with headings and mandatory in-text citations to the evidence packet.

参考文献（APA第7版）

• AERA, APA, & NCME. (2014). Standards for educational and psychological testing. American Educational Research Association.
• CAST. (2018). Universal Design for Learning guidelines version 2.2. CAST.
• Hallgren, K. A. (2012). Computing inter-rater reliability for observational data. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 8(1), 23–34.
• Harden, R. M., Stevenson, M., Downie, W. W., & Wilson, G. M. (1975). Assessment of clinical competence using an objective structured clinical examination (OSCE). BMJ, 1, 447–451.
• IPCC. (2023). Climate Change 2023: Synthesis report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
• Jonsson, A., & Svingby, G. (2007). The use of scoring rubrics: Reliability, validity and educational consequences. Educational Research Review, 2(2), 130–144.
• Kane, M. T. (2013). Validating the interpretations and uses of test scores. Journal of Educational Measurement, 50(1), 1–73.
• Messick, S. (1994). The interplay of evidence and consequences in the validation of performance assessments. Educational Researcher, 23(2), 13–23.
• Pellegrino, J. W., Chudowsky, N., & Glaser, R. (2001). Knowing what students know: The science and design of educational assessment. National Academy Press.
• Sitzmann, T. (2011). A meta-analytic examination of the instructional effectiveness of computer-based simulation games. Personnel Psychology, 64(2), 489–528.
• UNFCCC. (2015). Paris Agreement. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

有效实施要点（摘要）

• 严格控制角色、证据与难度，减少无关方差，突出构念相关表现（Messick, 1994）。
• 采用OSCE式流程标准化与脚本化主持，确保机会均等（Harden et al., 1975）。
• 通过双评、锚定样例与G研究管理评分误差（Shavelson & Webb, 1991; Hallgren, 2012）。
• 用分析性量表与证据包内引用规范化实践，提高评分可解释性与可迁移性（Jonsson & Svingby, 2007; AERA et al., 2014）。

Implementation essentials (summary)

• Tightly control roles, evidence, and difficulty to reduce construct-irrelevant variance (Messick, 1994).
• Standardize OSCE-like flow and scripted facilitation to ensure equity (Harden et al., 1975).
• Use double-scoring, anchored exemplars, and G-study to manage error (Shavelson & Webb, 1991; Hallgren, 2012).
• Apply analytic rubrics and enforced in-packet citation practices to strengthen interpretability (Jonsson & Svingby, 2007; AERA et al., 2014).